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GOLDWATER V. CARTER: CRISIS IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Covey T. Oliver
I. The Fundamentals Sketched
On December 13, 1979, the Supreme Court vacated and
dismissed, on political question and ripeness grounds, a
suit by several members of Congress challenging President
Carter's unilateral termination of the 1954 Mutual De-
fense Treaty between the United States and the Republic
of China (ROC).1 Although six members of the Court con-
curred in the dismissal,1 no single rationale garnered a
majority vote.
Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and Stevens,
dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable poli-
tical question involving the authority of the President
in the conduct of foreign relations. 3 Justice Powell
concurred in the result but advocated dismissal on ripe-
ness rather than political question grounds. Powell
contended that Congress' lack of "official action" with
regard to the President's termination precluded the
existence of an actual confrontation between the legis-
lative and executive branches.4 His opinion emphasized,
however, that if an actual confrontation occurred, the
Court would be obliged to reach the merits of the case.
5
Justices Blackmun and White dissented in part,
joining in the grant of certiorari but advocating full
oral argument and plenary consideration of the case.
Justice Brennan also dissented from the political ques-
tion rationale, voting to uphold the termination as part
* Hubbell Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
1. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979)(mem.).
2. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
Stewar and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Marshall
concurred in the result.
3. 100 S.Ct. at 536.
4. Id. at 533.
5. Id. at 536.
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of "the President's well established authority to recog-
nize, and withdraw recognition from foreign governments."6
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate a coherent
rationale in Goldwater v. Carter, considered in light of
the contradictory district 7 and circuit court8 opinions
in the case, highlights the existence of a constitutional
crisis of authority in the international agreements field.
This crisis, brought about by Congress's increasing "Will
to Participate"9 in foreign affairs operations, is also
manifested by the Panama treaties problems, the Salt II
uncertainty, and the risk of delay on four belatedly sub-
mitted human rights conventions. 1 0
The fundamental problem is that in times of poten-
tial danger, the newly asserted congressional "Will to
Participate" in foreign policy choices and operations is
not being approached in a scientific or curative fashion.
Instead, we have resorted to exegetic argument by and to
courts, as if the legalistic process of interstitial
6. Id. at 539.
7. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979); rev'd.
per csaiam, No. 79-2246 48 U,S,L.W, 2380 (D.C. Cir., November 30, 1979)
(presidenttial notice of termination not effective unless approved by
two-thirds of Senate or majority of both houses of Congress),
8. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 48 U.S,L,W. 2380 (D,C. Cir.,
November 30, 1979).
9. This phrase was first used by the author during the 1976
Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution, offered by the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science for an evaluation of
the Constitution. The report of the entire Conference will be
published shortly and will contain oral commentaries and summaries
as well as formal study papers. See C. Oliver, The United States
and th- World (Paper for Committee IV) reprinted in 426 Annals 166
(1976); see also E. Leech, Summary of the Plenary Session on Topic
IV reprinted in id. at 204.
10. Three United Nations conventions on human rights and the
Organization of American States Convention on Human Rights were
open for signature for several years before they were even signed
(ad referendum to Senate approval) by a President. Another period
passed before these, with many executive branch proposed reserva-
tions appended, were sent up to the Senate, where in 1980 they may
be debated. Undoubtedly a good deal of delay--during which the
United States has vigorously pushed its support of human rights
vls-a-via other states--is the result of the requirements that the
conventions be approved by two-thirds of the Senators present under
Article II of the Constitution.
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constitutional interpretation by a branch not skilled in
and not responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs
could provide a clear and reliable solution to the par-
ticipation issue. Unfortunately, formal amendment,
theoretically the most desirable way to deal with the
problem, is not a feasible means of clarification at this
time. The Senate is unlikely to approve by the necessary
two-thirds majority any reduction in its treaty-ratifica-
tion authority, and the alternate method of amendment via
constitutional convention, already an extraordinary reme-
dy, has been rendered even less plausible by fears of an
"open constitutional convention" spawned by the aftermath
of Californiat s Proposition 14. With judicial resolution
dubious, both as to clarity and effectiveness, and formal
amendment impractical, we should not overlook the legiti-
macy of accepting governmental practice over time as a
part of the evolving, "unwritten" Constitution. Thus,
one way to alleviate our present crisis is to encourage
the wider use of elements readily identifiable in United
States foreign affairs practice, viz:
(1) International agreements
referred by the President to the
Congress should be brought into
effect by simple majority vote in
both Houses wherever feasible,
especially where a two-thirds
majority in the Senate is doubtful
and the agreement is one of great
significance or urgency.
(2) There should be executive
restraint, monitored by Congress,
in the use of "executive agreements,"
i.e., those international under-
takings not referred to the Congress
for approval.
(3) Unless Congress, in approv-
ing an international agreement under
(1) provides otherwise, the President
should have the option to decide
whether to terminate the agreement
unilaterally, reporting his action
to the Congress, or to involve both
houses in the actual termination
process.
(4) If Congress should, in giving
bicameral, majority approval to an
international agreement, stipulate
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that Congress must participate
in termination, and the Presi-
dent does not veto the bill or
resolution of approval, he should
refer termination of such agree-
ment to Congress or face the risk
of impeachment and trial for
removal from office.
The judiciary should carefully consider whether it
ought to subsume issues of major contention between the
President and the Congress as to the sharing of authority
in foreign relations to its mission to declare "what
the law [Constitution] is."ll If the courts take any
such cases they should give great weight to what govern-
mental practice has been and avoid misuse of the process
of "interpretation" to substitute judicial preference
for state practice.12 Even more fundamentally, the
courts should admit that the Constitution is silent on
the termination question and that the skimpy history we
have of the making of the Constitution gives no guidance
either.13
II. The Uniqueness of United States Arrangements for
the Approval of International Agreements
American thinking about our arrangements for the
conduct of foreign relations is remarkably introverted.14
To require Senate approval for the termination of trea-
ties, as urged by Senator Goldwater and several leading
commentators,1 5 would put the United States even further
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
12. See Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. at 538 nl.
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.)(quoting concurring opinion below).
13. Id. at 537,
14. See also Oliver, Legal Relations among Legal Systems:
Games, Pains, and Some Pending Problems 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 902
(1979).
15. See, e.g., Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty
Abrogation 5 J. Legis. 46 (1978); Reisman & McDougal, Wlho Can
Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties, The National Law Journal, May 21,
1979 at 19. Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 15,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 25-39, 288-297 (April 9-11, 1979)
(statements of Professors Arthur Bestor, Charles E. Rise, Irwin S.
Rhodes, Eugene V. Rostow, and Alan Swan).
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out of step with the rest of the world as to the ques-
tion of parliamentary participation in treaty arrange-
ments.l6 Such a requirement would also ignore past
executive practice regarding the management of interna-
tional agreements.17 It may be argued that a judge ought
not to consider these factors in reaching a decision
but if this is so, it becomes a fair question whether the
judicial process is inherently capable of effectively
resolving the treaty termination issue.
In the cycle of treaty crises during the Carter
Administration, some chose to take an outdated federalist
approach that viewed the Senate as the "permanent repre-
sentative" of the States in the foreign affairs field and
thus justified its veto power over all aspects of foreign
affairs policy-making. This approach, however, ignores
both the Seventeenth Amendment,lB and the "unwritten
Constitution" that has evolved from long years of govern-
ment practice.19 Others, opposed on policy grounds to
the ending of the security relationship with Taiwan, in-
voke a non-existent parallelism to the constitutional
provision regarding treaty approval: if the Senate must
16. See Oliver, The Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal
State, Hague Academy of International Law Lecture Series Ch. 4,
1-1974 Recueil des Cours 346.
17. See President's Power to give Notice of Termination of
US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (memorandum to the Secretary of State
from Herbert J. Hansell, the Legal Adviser) (Dec. 15, 1978),
reprinted in Hearings on S. Res. 14 supra note 15, at 147.
18. "The Senate of the United States shall be . . . elected
by the people .... " This change from the selection of Senators by
the state legislatures, as originally provided for in Article I § 3,
was seen as reflecting the growing cohesion in American federalism.
Senators have become less the chosen spokespersons for the govern-
ment establishment of their state, and more the people's direct
representatives, similar to members of the House, but with wider
constituencies and longer terms.
19. The familiar account of President Washington's visit to
the Senate to confer on a pending international relations matter
that involved a treaty, his treatment there as an enemy within the
gates, and his statement that ". . . [he'd] be God-damned if Ihe'd]
ever go back. . ." set a precedent that no President since has
departed from. "Advice" in a formal sense has disappeared, despite
the efforts of former Senator Fulbright and some present members to
act as if it had not. But see J. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power
(1966).
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and does give its advice and consent to the making of a
treaty, then it must follow that the Senate is entitled
(by what vote?) to agree to the undoing of a treaty,
even though the Constitution is silent on this. 2 0
It is true that the role given to two-thirds of the
Senate by Article II of the Constitution is at the heart
of our problems in this area. In dealing with the
recent Panama Canal treaties, the Carter Administration
chose not to invoke that role, instead seeking bicameral
approval--with consequences that were easily foreseeable
as to the implementing legislation, without which the
United States would merely have entered into the
treaties only to default upon them. Salt II, however--
admittedly a less compelling case for bicameral action 2l
--and the four human rights conventions
20. The silences of the Constitution are fascinating. No
satisfactory methodology for their treatment has been worked out.
In foreign affairs the most persuasive theory is that, mindful
that they were writing articles ' or ages to come," as
John Adams put it, the Framers left the silences to the pull-and-
haul of political contention between the President and the Congress.
See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. at 537-38 (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)(question
whether constitutional amendment had been properly ratified by
state legislature was political question while ultimate resolution
should be left to Congress); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936)(President's delicate and plenary power in field
of international relations precludes imposition of narrowly defined
standards of conduct).
21. Under Article VI of the Constitution, all treaties made
under the authority of the United States are the "Supreme Law
of the land," hut functionally it does not follow from this that
all treaties have a so-called "Zone of the Interior 'conduct-
management"' content. The District Court in Goldioater did not
accept the Government's distinction between treaty-based "Supreme
Law" that is intended to and does have internal normative effects
and "Supreme Law" in alliance, defensS and purely external affairs
treaties that do not--beyond the general duty of all to treat any
"treaty" as such "Supreme Law"--find expression in normative form.
Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp at 962-63. Admittedly the
problem is more difficult to disentangle when the mutual security
treaty is part of a policy package that includes authorizing and
appropriating defense legislation, but even in such cases it is
not an overwhelmingly compelling concept that the legislative
mutual security arrangement and the treaty are functionally
indistinguishable as regards their "internal effect." If a mutual
security international agreement is not submitted to the Senate
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mentioned earlier,2 2 went only to the Senate where the
two-thirds approval requirement for international commit-
ment produces dangers of no action, diplomatically impos-
sible reservations or understandings, and blackmail of
the executive or related policy matters. These dangers
call into question the appropriateness of the Senate as
a treaty-approving body and highlight its lack of insti-
tutional sensitivity to America's unique treaty-making
arrangements.
During the time of the Roman Republic, foreign nego-
tiators never knew who spoke for Rome or when Rome became
bound. The Roman Senate would send out emissaries with
powers to negotiate, but the Senate frequently chose to
reverse itself, post-treaty, or to change the agreement.
Upsetting as this was to the international relations of
the times the Roman Senate was able to operate in this
fashion because Rome was a sole superpower that needed
neither allies nor good will in foreign parts. Even the
most short-sighted American chauvinist would have to ad-
mit that this is not our situation today. On the con-
trary, we now live in a multipolar world in which the
United States must co-exist and cooperate with other
developed democratic states, the Socialist block, the
Third World, and the oil-producing nations.
Despite this change in world power conditions, most
Americans, public figures included, are still very
"Roman" as to the making, performing, and ending of in-
ternational agreements, the essential fabric of modern
21. (Continued)
but is brought into effect as an international agreement by the
mutual security legislation (which required majority vote in both
Houses), two questions could conceivably arise:
i) Can both Houses by simple majority constitutionally effec-
tuate an international agreement negotiated by the Executive that
is not intended to and does not have internal normative effects?
ii) In the situation supposed, can the above distinction be
maintained as to the power of termination? As to this, see
pp. 18-20 infra, reporting that even in states where the legislature
must bring international agreements into effect by legislation the
"executive" uniformly may terminate them on its sole authority.
22. See note 10 supra.
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international relations. Under our structure of govern-
ment it is difficult to know who speaks for and binds,
the United States in international undertakings. As a
person who has spent many years in diplomatic and other
work involving foreign contact, I know that the American
form of government for international relations is yet
another "mystery inside an enigma." 23 This is so largely
because our ways of providing for commitment and perform-
ance vary so from those that the rest of the world uses
and knows. It is well for us to realize that this is so.
It is more important to understand why.
1. How other countries operate the "treaty power"
a. Representative democracies
In every representative democracy except the United
States the true executive is a cabinet chosen from the
legislative branch and ultimately dependent on it for
interim delegated power to manage both the legislative
program and the "government. '24 In one variant, that of
the United Kingdom and most of the Commonwealth, the
executive (Crown) alone makes international commitments,
and the parliament is involved strictly as a legislature
and only when conforming internal law is required to per-
form the international undertaking.2 5 However, the
reality that despite the existence of the Crown, the
true executive is a sub-group of the legislature makes
a parallel to the dichotomy of the American Constitution
illusory.
Under the continental model, the legislature must
give its consent to certain enumerated types of treaties
in the form of an authorizing statute which both vali-
dates the agreement internationally and makes it into
national law,2 6 Simple majorities control, and a single
house may be given the ratification power. Article 59
of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, for
23. W. Churchill, The First Month of War, in Blood, Sweat,
and Tears 173 (1941).
24. See L. Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution:
An International and Comparative Study (1971); 1 D.P. O'Connel,
International Law 60-85 (1965).
25. Wildhaber, supra note 24 at 27-28; W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England (1765) Bk. I, Ch. 7, p. 257.
26. Wildhaber, supra note 24 at 27; see aZso Oliver, supra
note 16.
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example, requires legislative consent to the treaties
that "regulate the political relations of the Federation
or relate to matters of federal legislation."2 7 Similar-
ly, Article 53 of the Constitution of the Fifth French
Republic mandates approval by parliament of many major
international agreements. 2 8 Such approval, however, is
predicated on a majority rather than a two-thirds vote,
and gives no special role to the French Senate in the
making or effectuating of treaties.
b. Dictators, Absolute Monarchs, "Facade"
Constitutions, and the Soviet Union
In this group of states, an international commit-
ment is made by an all-powerful executive at whatever
stage in the international agreement-making process that
person or group chooses. Sometimes a ritual legislative
ratification takes place, for example, by the federal
congress in Mexico, or the Politburo in the Soviet Union.
By parallel power processes, conforming national norms
are also brought into effect by the executive. Compared
with the countries in both groups (a) and (b), therefore,
the United States stands alone in interjecting a high
degree of uncertainty into its procedures for commitment
by international agreement.
2. The Power to End an International Commitment
At the April 1979 meeting of the American Society
of International Law, Professor Louis Sohn stated that
comparative law research has shown that no other repre-
sentative democracy, whatever its modalities for bring-
ing international agreement into effect, requires paral-
lel participation by the legislature in ending the obli-
gation.2 9 In the directed (non-democratic) countries,
obviously, termination by the executive alone is stan-
dard. While it could conceivably be argued that in
ministerial (cabinet) democracies the legislature does
27. Wildhaher, suprq note 24, at 47-48; OtConnel, supra
note 24 at 83.
28. Wildhaber, supra note 24 at 39-42; OConnel, supra note
24 at 72.
29. 1279 Proceedings of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, not published at this writing (summary of proceedings
of the Panel on the Power to Terminate a Mutual Defense Treaty).
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participate in ending international agreements through
its power to vote "no confidence" and turn out the Govern-
ment, this seems an unlikely scenario; treaty termination
is simply not the sort of issue that incites parliamentary
bodies to force general elections. Elsewhere, then, the
power to terminate clearly belongs to the arm of govern-
ment that conducts foreign relations, the executive. To
require congressional participation in this decision, as
the District Court in Goldwater proposed, would raise
more questions than it answers so far as certainty versus
uncertainty is concerned.3 0
3. Separation of Powers and Judicial Review in Other
Representative Democracies
Where there is an established ministerial Ccabinet)
form of government, the melding of legislative and execu-
tive power is obviously not unconstitutional under no-
tions of separation of powers.31 In the United Kingdom
and most other Commonwealth countries it is also true
that the judiciary has no authority to pass upon the
legitimacy of a legislative act or an executive act that
is within the Royal Perogative, i.e., an Act of the
Monarch (Crown). In the Federal German model, ordinary
courts lack judicial review power, but there is a special
Constitutional Court in which individuals may challenge
the direct denial of constitutional rights by any
statute, judicial decision or administrative act. 3 2
30. Judge Gasch's opinion, for example, would have allowed
termination approval by either two-thirds of the Senate, based on
that body's treaty making power, or a majority of both houses of
Congress, based primarily on congressional authority to repeal the
law of the land. 481 F. Supp at 964-965.
31. Although the Separation of Powers principle does not
appear anywhere in the constitutional text, it has been repeatedly
used, in place of a specific textual allocation of authority, to
invalidate legislative and executive actions. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Congress lacks power under either "necessary
and proper" clause or Twelfth Amendment to create Federal Election
Commission in manner violative of presidential appointments power);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (legislature may not abdicate
to police, prosecutor, and juries its responsibility for setting
standards of criminal law); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333
(1867) (pardoning power of the President not subject to legislative
control).
32. M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Modern World 22,
74-76 (1977).
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The French version of separation of powers, unlike
our own, makes it inappropriate for any branch of the
government to sit in judgment upon the acts of another
branch. Thus, the ultimate vindication of the constitu-
tion in France is not in the tribunals but at the barri-
cades. This is, of course, moderated in practice by the
capacity of the state and its officers to be sued by
private persons in the administrative courts headed by the
Conseil dEtat, and by presidential politics.
Thus again, with regard to commitment by interna-
tional agreement, the "uncertainty factor" of the United
States is bound to be higher than that of other countries,
either democratic or directed. Moreover, to an increas-
ing degree, American courts are choosing to hear cases
involving claims by Congressman against the President for
deprivation of their rights as individual legislators. 3 3
Potentially, the Executive, too, may have separation of
power grounds for appealing to the courts in regard to
various aspects of congressional encroachment, such as
the so-called "legislative veto."34
4. Foreign Affairs Practice and the Evolution of the
Unwritten Constitution
The Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware
that they were designing a document which was to last for
"ages to come" and which, therefore, would have to be
capable of adapting to changes in political, social, and
economic conditions. In many fields the design problems
that time would otherwise have brought to light about an
eighteenth century scheme of government have been avoided
by informal change through the concept of an evolving,
unwritten constitution--a concept too often reserved
exclusively for the work of the judicial process--and by
specific amendment. In the foreign relations field the
Presidency has, from the beginning, filled out the strict
33. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (member of Congress said to be injured in fact by President's
"pocket veto" which nullified member's vote in favor of bill and
denied him opportunity to override presidential veto); Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (congressman had standing
to challenge Vietnam war but question whether President had exceeded
his constitutional authority in continuing hostilities was non-
justiciable).
34. See Oliver, supra note % at 176-77.
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letter of the Constitution. Today these time-honored
practices are, for the first time, being challenged in
court by members of the legislative branch. It might
serve to cure a present lack of perception to recall that
from early times onward, in straight-line evolution, the
Presidency has put certain glosses of practice upon the
Constitution as written.
Foremost among these is the concept of the President
as Chief of State: i.e., as the international personifi-
cation of the United States.
In international law and diplomacy, foreigners may
not question, legally or officially, the authority of the
President and of his delegates in the field of foreign
relations to say what the United States will do. The
Constitution of 1789 brought this about. If the group
that gave us the present Constitution had provided simply
that federal authority was to be supreme in a federal
sphere that would include foreign relations and treaties,
the national legislature would undoubtedly have evolved
into a parliamentary form not unlike those of other demo-
cracies today. But instead the Founding Fathers chose
to provide a sole executive with great powers and to
guard against tyranny through a structure of separation
of powers and a system of checks and balances.
Although the Constitution did not spell out the de-
tails of the executive power, the first President rapid-
ly began to do so. All subsequent Presidents have fol-
lowed in his footsteps and all, until quite recently,
have done so without the development of constitutional
crises. On this issue there were no impeachments and
trials before the Senate and, until lately, no lawsuits
by members of Congress. In fact, only in very recent
times has it ever been made clear that the President--
as distinguished from a Secretary of State such as Mr.
Madison--is not above "the law" as found by the federal
courts. 3 5 Even more novel is judicial cognizance of
suits by members of Congress in which a court must deter-
mine what the Constitution requires as to nuances and
complications within the concept of separation of powers
35. The Court might well have thought twice before uttering
its magnificent dicta in Marbury v. Madison if the defendant had
been the President. Before United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), the question of the suability of a sitting President had
not been faced.
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itself. 36
In one line of cases, however--United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 3 7 and its progeny--decided
before the present wave of litigation, the Supreme Court
recognized that the authority of the United States in the
foreign relations field belongs fundamentally to the
executive branch, except as the Constitution might speci-
fically require under our system of "checks and balances"
as alterations of historical concepts of "executive" and
"legislative" power. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Goldwater v. Carter reaffirms the logic of Curtiss-Wright
and recognizes that the judicial power is itself limited
by principles of appropriateness when Congress and the
President grapple as to their respective foreign affairs
authorities.
Another presidential gloss-by-practice that has
grown up in response to the difficulties caused by the
Senate's two-thirds approval rule for treaties is the
use of "executive agreements." Clearly, Presidents
would not so often have committed the United States
internationally without making "treaties" in the Article
II sense had the two-thirds principle not have been the
tremendous impediment it has been to making timely and
sensible arrangements with other nations. In all
countries day-to-day foreign affairs operations require
minor and implementing commitments within the frameworks
of larger commitments. The use of the executive agree-
ment in the United States however, has gone beyond this,
although legally such agreements are valid only to the
extent that the agreement is one within the inherent
foreign relations powers of the President. The President
cannot make an international agreement on his own that
displaces an act of Congress. He probably could not
make one which would have the force of federal law
36. For examples of courts' unwillingness to perform this
task, see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.Ci Cir. 1978) (congress-
man lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from
allegedly unconstitutional composition of Federal Reserve System
Committee); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in
absence of concrete injury, congressman lacks standing to challenge
alleged misuse of funding and reporting provisions of C.I.A. Act);
Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (neither private citizen nor U.S. Senator has standing to
challenge membership and functioning of National Petroleum Council).
37. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See generally Oliver, supra note 9,
at 191-93.
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even if no act of Congress were contradicted. But until
recently it had been assumed that the Chief of State
could manage military alliances and carry on authorized
use of force on his own, including making relevant, non-
spending commitments to other states. The Supreme Court's
decision in Goldwater re-enforces this assumption, while
leaving Congress and the President free to work out appro-
priate arrangements for the sharing of power in other
aspects of the international relations field.
III. The Need for a Democratic Solution to the
Treaty Termination Problem
Thirty-five years ago, in their significant article
supporting the equivalency of congressional-executive
international agreements with Senate-consented "treaties,"
Professors McDougal and Lans argued for wider and thus
more democratic participation in the commitment-by-agree-
ment process.50 Today, the resort by a few members of Con-
gress to the courts reveals another aspect of democratic
versus elitist responses to the problem.
The plaintiffs in Goldwater objected both to the
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, and
to what they perceived as an unconstitutional executive
act. The defendants elected not to remove the reason for
litigation because they felt that a principle had to be
maintained.39 Thus, we were left embroiled in court on a
grave issue that needs reformist attention, before judges
that could not, within the limitations of their offices,
properly solve the problem. Fortunately, the Supreme Court
recognized these limitations and correctly dismissed the
suit, thus allowing Congress and the President, with help
from the public and the media, to try to fashion sound
solutions to the problem of international commitment for
now and the future.
The beginning of wisdom would be for the Administra-
tion and the leaderships of the House and the Senate to
38. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 Yale L.J. 181, 534 (1944-1945).
39. As the District Court opinion noted, the President could
have gone to Congress and gotten simple majority authorization to
end the mutual defense treaty, thus rendering the litigation moot.
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agree to work together toward a resolution, beginning
perhaps with consideration of the simple lines of action
sketched in part I, above. Such a solution would both
protect the authority of the President in the foreign
relations field and enhance congressional participation
in the making and execution of international agreements.

